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Maintaining a safe work environment is a priority for many industries.  For the aviation 
industry, this is especially true because technology failures and human error can result in 
catastrophic loss of equipment and life (e.g., Evans, Glendon, & Creed, 2007).  While 
technological advances have increased safety within aviation (e.g., Evans et al., 2007), aviation-
related injuries and illnesses remain relatively high when compared to other industries.  
According to the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2017), the rate of 
occupational injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time air transportation workers was 6.2 in 2015.  
For that same year, the rate of injuries and illnesses requiring days away from work, job 
restriction, or transfer was 5.1.  These rates exceed the average incidence rates across all 
industries, state and local government (3.3 and 1.7, respectively).  Given these statistics, it is 
important to identify antecedents to aviation-related injuries and illnesses to better inform 
workplace interventions designed to improve the safety performance of those employed within 
the aviation industry.  Thus, the purpose of this study is to examine the individual and combined 
effects of two potential antecedents to aviation-related safety performance in a sample of aviators 
in flight training: safety climate and occupational callings. 
Safety Climate 
Organizations have traditionally assessed their safety performance using lagging 
indicators.  Lagging indicators are unwanted safety events that have already occurred, such as 
accidents and system failures (e.g., O’Connor, O’Dea, Kennedy, & Buttrey, 2011).  Because the 
aviation industry qualifies as a High Reliability Organization (HRO; succeeds in avoiding 
catastrophes in high-risk environments), accident and incident rates are often too low to be useful 
indicators of safety performance (e.g., O’Connor et al., 2011).  Instead, O’Connor et al. (2011) 
encouraged the use of leading indicators of safety as more proactive and informative alternatives.  
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Leading indicators of safety are defined as processes or inputs required to deliver desired safety 
outcomes (Health and Safety Executive [HSE], 2006).  One of the most commonly used leading 
indicators of safety is safety climate (e.g., O’Connor et al., 2011). 
Safety climate is defined as employee perceptions of organizational policies and practices 
designed to reduce accidents and related injuries (e.g., Beus, Payne, Bergman, & Arthur, 2010).  
A favorable safety climate exists when an organization promotes safety through the development 
of safety policies and procedures that are interpreted, enforced, and encouraged through 
managerial practices and behaviors (Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005).  On the other hand, if 
safety climate is poor, safety protocols may be overlooked or are non-existent, which contributes 
to an increase in work-related accidents and related injuries.  Indeed, research has established a 
link between safety climate and these important safety outcomes (see meta-analysis by Beus et 
al., 2010). 
Neal and Griffin (1997) developed a theoretical model to help explain how safety climate 
might influence employee safety performance.  They theorized that safety climate has an effect 
on an employee’s safety performance through their safety motivation (Neal & Griffin, 2006; 
Wallace & Chen, 2006).  Safety motivation is defined as an employee’s intention to adhere to 
safety policies, practices, and procedures.  Safety performance, on the other hand, consists of two 
components: safety compliance and safety participation. Safety compliance requires adhering to 
an organization's safety policies, procedures, and practices, whereas, safety participation requires 
actively promoting safety within the workplace (i.e., going beyond that which is required).  In 
support of this model, Neal and Griffin (2006) found that safety climate predicted subsequent 
changes in individual reports of safety motivation, and safety motivation, in turn, predicted 
subsequent changes in safety performance.  Block, Sabin, and Patankar (2007) found a similar 
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link between climate and safety performance in their analysis of data from a flight operations 
environment that had gone nearly a decade without a reportable accident. 
There is a lack of published research on the relationship between safety climate and 
indicators of safety performance within the aviation industry.  In fact, a recent review (O’Connor 
et al., 2011) of 23 studies examining safety climate within commercial and military aviation 
found that the majority of those studies did not link safety climate to safety performance.  
Studies such as that conducted by Block et al. (2007), in which aviation performance, climate, 
and other psychological variables are evaluated are much needed in aviation.  Such research is 
required to establish the concurrent validity of existing safety climate tools and to facilitate the 
support of, and use for, such tools in aviation organizations (Bowen & Sabin, 2016).  Only then 
can the aviation industry use those tools with confidence to identify, in advance, the strengths 
and weaknesses within the aviation industry that may influence accident and incident rates.  
Thus, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Safety climate is positively related to (a) safety motivation, (b) safety 
compliance, and (c) safety participation. 
Hypothesis 2: Accidents are negatively related to (a) safety climate, (b) safety 
motivation, (c) safety compliance, and (d) safety participation. 
Occupational Callings 
Extensive research supports safety climate as an important antecedent to safety 
performance across many industries (e.g., Beus et al., 2010); however, perceptions of safety 
climate are necessarily influenced by interactions among existing organizational members.  
Identifying antecedents to safety performance on which employees may be selected into jobs is a 
worthwhile research endeavor and may, overtime, improve an organization’s safety climate and 
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thereby result in reduced work-related injuries and accidents (e.g., Andel, Pindek, & Spector, 
2016).  The extent to which people have a calling to a particular occupation may be one such 
antecedent. 
The definition of an occupational calling is multifaceted and can be defined as follows: it 
is an occupation that a person finds intrinsically motivating, meaningful, and as central part of 
his or her identity (Gazica & Spector, 2015).  “Intrinsic motivation” is defined as an individual's 
motivation to engage in work because he or she finds the work itself (i.e., no external rewards 
required) engaging, enjoyable, satisfying, or interesting (Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 
1994).  Within the specific context of work, meaningfulness has been narrowly defined as “the 
value of a work goal or purpose, judged to the individual's own ideals or standards” (May, 
Gilson, & Harter, 2004, p. 11).  Thus, the participation in meaningful work is a deeply personal 
and subjective experience that may have far reaching positive impacts on one's life (e.g., Steger 
& Dik, 2009).  Finally, when an occupation is central to one’s identity, the work therein aligns 
with her or his broader sense of purpose in life (Duffy & Dik, 2013).  Thus, an occupational 
calling is a fairly stable set of core beliefs that form an occupational orientation of meaning, 
engagement, and passion, and is often viewed as a primary source of work motivation (Dik & 
Duffy, 2009).  Indeed, the extant literature on occupational callings has consistently shown that 
living one’s calling is positively related to various forms of work related well-being, 
commitment, engagement, and decision-making (e.g., Dik, Sargent, & Steger, 2008; Duffy, 
Allan, Autin, & Bott, 2013; Duffy, Allan, Autin, & Douglass, 2014; Duffy, Bott, Allan, Torrey, 
& Dik, 2012; Duffy, Dik, & Steger, 2011).  Most of this work, however, has focused on 
employee attitudes and intentions, while paying very little attention to work-related behaviors 
(e.g., safety performance), a research gap highlighted by a recent review (Duffy & Dik, 2013). 
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The extent to which someone identifies an occupation as his or her calling may have 
relevance to the safety domain.  The first (and only, to the authors’ knowledge) study to link 
safety to occupational callings was Andel et al. (2016) who found that the relationship between 
safety climate and safety performance was stronger in emergency medical technicians for whom 
emergency medicine was their calling.  These authors argued that employees who are living their 
calling might be more committed and engaged in all aspects of their job, including safety 
performance.  Thus, assessing the extent to which someone is living his or her calling within the 
aviation industry may serve two laudable purposes: (1) strengthening the existing safety climate; 
and (2) explaining variance in safety performance above that which is explained by safety 
climate alone.  With this in mind, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Living an occupational calling is positively related to (a) safety climate, 
(b) safety motivation, (c) safety compliance, and (d) safety participation. 
Hypothesis 4: Living an occupational calling is negatively related to accidents. 
Hypothesis 5: Living an occupational calling explains variance above safety climate in 
(a) safety motivation, (b) safety compliance, (c) safety participation, and (d) accidents. 
It is worth noting that scoring low on living a calling may mean an individual has: (1) a 
calling that he or she is unable to pursue; or (2) no calling at all.  Distinguishing among these 
individuals is important as organizational scholars have suggested that outcomes associated with 
occupational callings may be a function of the calling group in which any given individual falls 
(e.g., Dik & Duffy, 2009; Duffy et al., 2012; Gazica & Spector, 2015).  Potential calling groups 
include those (a) living a calling (answered calling group); (b) perceiving but not pursuing a 
calling (unanswered calling group); (c) for whom a calling is irrelevant (no calling group); and 
(d) experiencing both an answered calling and an unanswered calling (dual group) (e.g., Dik & 
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Duffy, 2009; Duffy et al., 2012; Gazica & Spector, 2015).  For example, Gazica and Spector 
(2015) found that academics who reported an unanswered calling also reported poorer physical 
and psychological health than those who reported an answered calling or no calling at all. Thus, 
we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6: Those within the answered calling group report higher levels of (a) safety 
climate, (b) safety motivation, (c) safety compliance, and (d) safety participation than those 
within any other calling group. 
Hypothesis 7: Those within the answered calling group report lower levels of accidents 
than those within any other calling group. 
Method 
 To address the above hypotheses, we administered a self-report survey (see the Measures 
subsection below) to fulltime university students who also were in flight training (see the 
Participants subsection below).  We chose a self-report survey method because our focal study 
variables (e.g., individual perceptions of safety climate; occupational calling) are abstract 
concepts and difficult to assess via other methods, e.g., observation (Hinkin, 1998).  Prior to 
administration, we pretested the survey on a smaller sample of the target population (N = 5 
fulltime students in flight training) to ensure that the items were unambiguous and applicable to 
flight line practices and procedures.  For a full discussion of limitations to the chosen 
methodology, please see the Limitations section below.  
Participants 
We recruited 64 members of this study’s target population: fulltime aeronautical science 
students from a private southwestern university, all of whom were participating in flight training.  
The population of interest (flight students in a collegiate aviation program) was selected for two 
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reasons.  First, the authors focused the present study on aviation safety climate and its 
antecedents (specifically, occupational calling as a potential component); selecting collegiate 
flight students allowed for a reduction in population demographics and other potential 
confounding variables that may have created noise in sample analysis.  Second, the structure and 
consistency of organizational safety climate training and expectations within the narrow bands of 
a collegiate aviation organization, also reduced potential variability in the sample in order to 
clarify analysis of the variables of interest.  Of the 64 participants, 15 were female and 49 were 
male, which reflects the current gender distribution of the university.  The average age of the 
participants was 20.7 years (SD = 2.6). 
Recruitment 
Participants were recruited: (1) via university issued student email addresses; (2) in 
aeronautical science courses contingent on prior instructor approval; and (3) student word-of-
mouth.  To participate, students had to be 18 years of age or older, fulltime students in the 
Department of Aeronautical Sciences, and currently participating in flight training.  Prior to 
participation, all participants were informed of the nature and content of the survey measures and 
that participation was completely voluntary and anonymous.  The survey was administered 
online via Survey Monkey.  The authors received IRB approval for the research protocol prior to 
data collection (IRB#17-079). 
Measures 
All measures had six response options ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly 
agree) unless otherwise specified below.  All measures chosen are well established in the extant 
organizational literature with supporting validity and reliability evidence (see measurement 
specific citations below). 
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Answered (i.e., living an) occupational calling.  To measure the extent to which each 
participant perceives being a pilot as his or her occupational calling, we used an adapted version 
of the Dobrow and Tosti-Kharas’s (2011) 12-item answered occupational calling measure.  As 
originally developed, Dobrow and Tosti-Kharas’s measure was specifically designed to tap into a 
particular occupation, for example, business or music.  Thus, we adapted each item of this 
measure to specifically attend to the profession of a pilot.  An example item is “The first thing I 
often think about when I describe myself to others is that I’m a pilot.” 
Unanswered occupational callings.  The extent to which participants perceive, but are 
not currently pursuing an occupational calling was measured by a 6-item scale developed by 
Gazica (2014).  An example item is “I personally identify with a career that I’m not currently 
pursuing.” 
Safety climate.  Safety climate was assessed with an adapted version of Zohar and 
Luria’s (2005) 16-item scale. Each item prompted the participant to indicate the extent to which 
he or she agreed that his or her flight instructor promoted aviation safety practices and 
procedures.  Example items include “my instructor makes sure I receive all the equipment 
needed to operate aircraft safely,” and “my instructor says a ‘good word’ to me when I pay 
special attention to safety.” 
Safety motivation.  To assess the willingness of participants to adhere to safety practices 
and procedures within aviation, we used an adapted version of a 3-item scale developed Neal and 
Griffin (2006).  We adapted one item to pertain specifically to aviation safety, i.e., “I believe that 
it is important to reduce the risk of accidents and incidents at the flight line.”  The remaining two 
items remained unchanged from the original measure, e.g., “I feel that it is worthwhile to put in 
effort to maintain or improve my personal safety.” 
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Safety compliance.  To assess the extent to which participants perform essential aviation 
safety behaviors (e.g., wearing personal protective equipment), we used an adapted version of a 
3-item scale developed by Neal and Griffin (2006).  We adapted each of the three items to refer 
specifically to safety within aviation, e.g., “I use all necessary safety equipment while flying 
aircraft.” 
Safety participation.  To assess the extent to which participants contribute to a culture 
that supports safety within aviation, we used an adapted version of a 3-item scale developed by 
Neal and Griffin (2006).  We adapted each of the three items to refer specifically to aviation 
safety, e.g., “I voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that help to improve flight safety.” 
Accidents.  Exposure to accidents during flight training was assessed using a 5-item 
measure adapted from Hayes, Perander, Smecko, and Trask (1998).  An example item includes 
“I had an accident that resulted in an injury serious enough that I needed medical treatment.” 
This scale had five response options ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (four or more times) over the 
past year. 
Results 
Table 1 presents the inter-correlations among this study’s variables as well as the mean, 
standard deviation, and internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) estimate for each of 
this study’s measurement instruments.  The data supported the reliability of each measure 
chosen, with alphas ranging from .80 to .93 (see Table 1). 
Correlational Analyses  
Hypotheses 1 through 4 proposed linear relationships between two study variables; thus 
correlational analyses were employed as the most appropriate method to test such hypotheses 
(Howell, 2012).  All four hypotheses were fully supported by the data.  In explanation, safety 
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climate is positively related to safety motivation (r = .57, p < .01), safety compliance (r = .62, p 
< .01), and safety participation (r = .47, p < .01).  Accidents are negatively related to safety 
climate (r = -.39, p < .01), safety motivation (r = -.45, p < .01), safety compliance (r = -.48, p < 
.01), and safety participation (r = -.25, p < .05).  Occupational calling is positively related to 
safety climate (r = .32, p < .05), safety motivation (r = .49, p < .01), safety compliance (r = .44, p 
< .01), and safety participation (r = .57, p < .01).  Finally, occupational calling is negatively 
related to accidents (r = -.42, p < .01). 
Regression Analyses 
Hypothesis 5 proposed that occupational callings would explain variance in safety 
motivation, compliance, and participation above that which is explained by safety climate alone, 
requiring stepwise regression analyses (Howell, 2012).  Thus, we ran a series of stepwise 
regression analyses in which safety climate was entered in the first step and occupational calling 
in the second step.  As shown in Table 2, Hypothesis 5 was fully supported by the data. 
Occupational calling explained variance above safety climate in safety motivation (β = .27, p < 
.01), safety compliance (β = .24, p < .05), safety participation (β = .46, p < .01), and accidents (β 
= -.36, p < .01). 
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Table 1 
          
Correlations Among and Descriptive Statistics for All Study Variables  
     
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Gender  --  --  --  
       
2. Unanswered Calling 1.96 1.18  -.07 (.93) 
      
3. Answered Calling 5.29 0.66 .04  -.28* (.88) 
     
4. Safety Climate 5.22 0.72 .03 -0.15 .32* (.93) 
    
5. Safety Motivation 5.65 0.71  -.17  -.29* .49** .57** (.90) 
   
6. Safety Compliance 5.49 0.67  -.15  -.28* .44** .62** .76** (.80) 
  
7. Safety Participation 4.91 0.93 .11  -.33** .57** .47** .46** .49** (.84) 
 
8. Accidents 1.17 0.52 .08 0.12  -.42**  -.39**  -.45**  -.48**  -.25* (.89) 
N = 64 
          
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Gender: Female = 1; Male = 2 
Coefficients along the diagonal are Internal Consistency Reliability Estimates  
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Table 2 
     
Regression Analyses 
   
      Safety Performance 
    Safety Motivation Safety Compliance Safety Participation Accidents 
Step 1 β β β β 
Safety Climate .57** .62** .47**  -.39** 
R2 .32** .39** .22**  .15** 
     
Step 2 
    
Safety Climate .48** .55** .32**  -.27* 
Answered Calling .27** .24* .46**  -.36** 
∆R2 .07** .05* .19** .12** 
N = 64 
     
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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ANOVA Analyses 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 proposed that those within the answered occupational calling group 
would report higher means on safety climate, motivation, compliance and participation, and a 
lower mean on accidents than other occupational calling groups.  To test for these group mean 
differences, one-way analysis of variance statistical (ANOVA) tests were used (Howell, 2012). 
To do so, we first placed participants into four distinct occupational calling groups.  Each 
participant was categorized by where he or she fell in relation to the median on both the 
answered occupational calling scale (Mdn = 5.34; AOC) and the unanswered occupational 
calling scale (Mdn = 1.5; UOC).  In explanation, participants who fell above the median on the 
UOC but below the median on the AOC were placed in the “unanswered occupational calling 
group” (N = 18).  Participants who fell above the median of the AOC but below the median on 
the UOC were placed in the “answered occupational calling group” (N = 17).  Those who fell 
below the median on both scales were placed in the “no calling group” (N = 14).  Finally, those 
who fell above the median on both scales were placed in the “dual group” (N = 15).  Those 
within the dual group were experiencing both an answered calling and an unanswered calling. 
Once the groups were created, we conducted a series of ANOVA tests using SPSS 
software.  As summarized in Table 3, the results indicated that there were significant group 
differences on each of this study’s outcome variables except for safety climate and accidents.  
We also tested the ANOVA’s homogeneity of variance assumption for each outcome variable 
using the Levene’s statistic (Field, 2009).  Homogeneity of variance across groups can be 
assumed only for the following outcomes: safety motivation, safety participation, and accidents.  
Because of this and the fact that the groups have unequal sample sizes, we also inspected two 
alternative versions of the F-ratio: Welch’s F and Brown-Forsythe’s F, both of which are more 
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rigorous and reliable when the homogeneity of variance assumption is violated and groups have 
unequal sample sizes (Field, 2009).  These tests supported the ANOVA results without 
exception. 
We next conducted a series of Duncan’s tests to compare the four groups on those 
outcome variables on which they differed significantly.  Hypothesis 7 was not supported by the 
data because there were no group mean differences in accident reports.  Hypotheses 6 was 
partially supported by the data.  First, there were no group mean differences in safety climate 
perceptions.  Second, those within the answered calling group reported significantly higher levels 
of safety motivation and safety compliance than the unanswered calling group only, and they 
reported higher levels of safety participation than both the unanswered calling and no calling 
groups but not the dual calling group. 
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Table 3  
      
Summary Results for One-Way ANOVAs 
  
Outcome Variables 
ANOVA 
 
F-ratio p < Group 
Mean  
Safety Motivation 3.195 0.03 
  
          AOC 
  
5.94b 
 
          UOC 
  
5.26a 
 
          No Calling 
  
5.64ab 
 
          Dual 
  
5.78b 
 
Safety Compliance 3.300 0.03 
  
          AOC 
  
5.67b 
 
          UOC 
  
5.09a 
 
          No Calling 
  
5.62b 
 
          Dual 
  
5.64b 
 
Safety Participation 9.846 0.00 
  
          AOC 
  
5.43b 
 
          UOC 
  
4.22a 
 
          No Calling 
  
4.62a 
 
          Dual     5.40b 
 
AOC = Answered Occupational Calling; UOC = Unanswered Occupational Calling. 
Based on Duncan’s tests, group means bearing the same alphabetical superscript do not significantly differ from 
each other. 
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Discussion 
This research supports the concurrent validity of the study-specific safety climate and 
occupational calling instruments within the aviation industry.  That is, safety climate and 
occupational callings were significantly related to safety motivation, safety performance, and 
accidents (collectively, safety indicators) in the expected directions.  This study further suggests 
that occupational callings can explain variance in all three safety indicators above that which can 
be explained by safety climate alone.  Thus, assessing the extent to which an applicant is called 
to a particular occupation within the aviation industry prior to employment may not only serve to 
bolster the existing safety climate but also provide additional information on an industry’s 
potential for future safety mishaps. 
This study further explored whether grouping pilots into occupational calling groups can 
inform safety indicators more accurately than simply assessing the extent to which a pilot is 
currently living his or her occupational calling.  In explanation, someone scoring low on an 
answered calling assessment may be suffering from an unanswered calling or have no calling at 
all.  Our data suggests that only those suffering from an unanswered calling – that is, called to an 
occupation other than flying aircraft – reported significantly lower levels of safety motivation 
and safety compliance than any other calling group.  Furthermore, those fortunate enough to be 
living their calling as a pilot (i.e., answered calling and dual calling groups) were more likely 
than all other groups to actively promote aviation safety beyond simple compliance.  Failing to 
understand these group distinctions may result in a loss of information or faulty decision-making. 
Contrary to expectations, there were no occupational calling group differences on safety 
climate or accidents.  Failure to find group differences on accidents might be explained by the 
low base rate of accidents reported in this study.  However, the failure to find group differences 
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on safety climate might be explained by theory.  Safety climate is defined as the employees’ 
perceptions of their organization’s policies, procedures, and practices designed to reduce 
accidents and related injuries (e.g., Beus et al., 2010).  Safety climate can be measured at the 
individual, work-unit, or organizational levels (e.g., Zohar, 2000).  Safety climate at the work-
unit level should reflect shared perceptions of that unit’s safety practices (e.g., Zohar, 2000).  
Unlike other studies comparing the safety climate of different organizational units and the effects 
of those differences on relevant safety outcomes (e.g., Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005), the 
groups created for this study operated within the same organization unit – a collegiate flight 
department.  Theoretically then, safety climate should vary little between occupational calling 
groups within the same organizational unit. 
Limitations 
While this study offers new insights into the concurrent validity of safety climate and 
occupational calling assessments within the aviation industry, it is not without limitations.  First, 
validity evidence is instrument-specific and the results of this study should not be generalized to 
other instruments of assessment for either safety climate or occupational callings.  The 
instruments used in data collection are parsimonious in item numbers per scale, but the use of 
previously published and validated instruments to measure our constructs of interest facilitated 
use of these more parsimonious scales rather than the larger item numbers that a novel 
questionnaire would require.  While this parsimony does limit some potential avenues of 
research in the study, it also aided in reducing potential survey fatigue.  Second, our data is 
cross-sectional, thus, limiting our ability to infer the temporal sequence of safety climate, 
occupational callings, and safety indicators.  While there is some support in the extant literature 
that safety climate precedes rather than follows relevant outcomes (e.g., Spector, Yang, & Zhou, 
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2015; Yang, Spector, Chang, Gallant-Roman, & Powell, 2012), more work is required to support 
the same for occupational callings.  Third, all data were collected via self-report measures raising 
a concern that common method variance upwardly biased the results of this study.  Spector 
(2006), however, found that common method variance is often overstated and that an appropriate 
study design is one capable of answering the study’s research questions.  This study’s primary 
focus was on how individual perceptions of safety climate and occupational callings influence 
safety indicators.  Individual perceptions are internal states that are best collected via self-report 
measures.  While we recognize that self-report is not the only means to collect data on safety 
performance (i.e., observation methods), we chose to limit the burden of labor on those external 
to this study (e.g., flight-line supervisors; flight instructors).   
Finally, this study is based on a relatively small sample of the population of interest – 
beginning pilots, possibly affecting the generalizability of our results to more diverse samples 
within the aviation industry.  While sample size limitations may limit the larger generalizability 
of the present study’s results, the intent of the research was to test and pursue whether there is a 
link between occupational callings and potential safety issues in the high-consequence 
environment of aviation.  The authors’ assessment is that the unique nature of the hypotheses 
explored here warrant dissemination of the available data, so that additional reliability and 
validation testing in broader and more diverse samples could refine understandings of the 
variable relationships.  The use of a sample with reduced demographic variance (collegiate flight 
training students) aids in improving the power of the sample, even a moderate-to-small sample 
size in use. 
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Conclusion 
The ability of safety climate and occupational calling assessments to inform the potential 
for safety mishaps within the aviation industry was investigated and supported.  First, both 
instruments were related to safety motivation, safety performance, and accidents in the expected 
directions.  Second, pilots who were living their calling also reported higher levels of safety 
motivation and safety performance than those who felt called to different occupations.  Finally, 
this study suggests that assessing both safety climate and occupational callings can inform the 
potential for safety mishaps better than either alone.  As such, there is potential for aviation 
safety managers, organizational leaders, and others to incorporate data on occupational callings 
into a comprehensive safety management system (SMS) or safety assessment program.  
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